This paper examines the optimal reaction of fiscal policy to permanent and transitory shocks to output in a model of smoothing of tax and public good supply.
Introduction
Recently there is an increase in research on the cyclicality of fiscal policy. This research is both theoretical, asking how governments should react to output fluctuations, and empirical, studying how governments actually react to such fluctuations. This paper presents two main contributions to this research. The first contribution is that instead of considering only aggregate fluctuations, we decompose these fluctuations to permanent and to transitory shocks. We then analyze theoretically how a government should react to each of such shocks, and also study it empirically in OECD countries. Our second contribution is that we examine the motive of smoothing of public consumption over time and show that it should lead the government to run a counter-cyclical policy with respect to transitory shocks, namely a negative transitory shock should increase the supply of the public good relative to output.
The paper presents a simple model of a government that derives utility from its supply of the public good, it derives disutility from the taxes, since it is benevolent, and it derives disutility from the size of its debt relative to output, to avoid diverging debt levels. Maximization of this intertemporal utility by the government leads to a policy which is counter-cyclical with respect to transitory shocks, and a-cyclical with respect to permanent shocks. This holds both with respect to public expenditures and with respect to the deficit as well. We then test the model, using the Blanchard and Quah (1989) decomposition of cycles to transitory and permanent shocks in OECD countries, and find strong support to our theoretical results.
The literature on cyclicality of fiscal policy began with the Keynesian theory, which advocated countercyclical fiscal policy in order to stimulate aggregate demand in times of recession.
1 The first study of fiscal policy in the context of the neoclassical model was Barro (1979) , who analyzes a government that minimizes the cost of taxation over time by smoothing the tax rate. Such a policy leads to counter-cyclicality of budget deficits, while public consumption is constant over time by assumption. Actually our theoretical model follows closely the approach of Barro (1979) , but it adds smoothing of public good supply to smoothing of taxes, and it also adds to the analysis the distinction between transitory and permanent shocks.
The theoretical literature on cyclicality of fiscal policy since Barro (1979) has been quite scarce. 2 Much of it has focused on the role of various components of fiscal policy such as automatic stabilizers, in Christiano (1984) and Cohen and Follette (1999) . Gordon and Leeper (2005) use a similar framework of intertemporal optimization of the government and reach a conclusion that counter-cyclical fiscal policy is undesirable, but they do not consider transitory shocks. There are a number of papers who make a distinction between demand and supply shocks with respect to fiscal policy, such as Cohen and Follette (1999) and Taylor (2000) , but few focus on transitory and permanent shocks.
3 cyclical or a-cyclical in developed countries. In contrast Gavin and Perotti (1997) found that fiscal policy is highly pro-cyclical in Latin American countries. These findings led to much research that re-examined these findings and corroborated them to a large extent. Lane (2003) shows that cyclicality of fiscal policy varies significantly across categories and also across OECD countries, but in most advanced economies they are counter-cyclical. Arreaza, Sørensen, and Yosha (1999) and Gali and Perotti (2003) find further support for counter-cyclical fiscal policy in EU and in OECD countries. Gali (2005) even finds that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical in all industrialized countries and that counter-cyclicality even intensified after 1991. Darby and Melitz (2007) find that social expenditures account for the vast majority of countercyclical fiscal policy. Fatas and Mihov (2003) find that most of the counter-cyclicality of deficits in developed countries is a result of the automatic stabilizers. As mentioned above, the findings in developing countries are very different. Talvi and Vegh (2005) show, based on a large sample of less developed countries, that government spending and taxes are highly procyclical. This finding is also corroborated by Akitoby et al (2004) , by Alesina and Tabellini (2005) , and by Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) . The main explanation for this difference in fiscal policy between developed and less developed countries is that governments in less developed countries face credit constraints, which force them to cut expenditures during recessions. Recently other explanations were offered, based on political economy, as in Talvi and Vegh (2005) , Alesina and Tabellini (2005) and Ilzetzki (2008) .
This paper is related to this empirical literature and mainly to the research on OECD countries. Our main contribution is moving from testing the relation between fiscal policy and output to testing the relations between fiscal policy and the transitory and permanent shocks separately. We show that the two types of shocks have very different effects on fiscal policy and the main counter-cyclical effect comes from the transitory shocks and not from the permanent ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of intertemporal optimal fiscal policy that reacts to permanent and temporary shocks. Section 3 describes the derivation of transitory and permanent shocks to output in a sample of 22 OECD countries. Section 4 outlines the empirical implications of the model and the general empirical strategy. Section 5 tests the cyclicality of public expenditures and deficits in OECD countries in reaction to temporary and permanent shocks. Section 6 concludes. In the appendices we examine robustness of the empirical results, by testing for individual countries, and by using the Arellano and Bond estimation.
A model of Optimal Fiscal Policy
We present a simple model in which the government maximizes a welfare function. The maximization determines both the level of taxation and the level of public expenditures, and consequently also the level of public debt. The government maximizes welfare in an uncertain environment, where output is driven by shocks. The reaction of the government to these shocks determines the cyclicality of fiscal policy. We go one step further and differentiate between transitory and permanent shocks to output. This enables us to distinguish between the optimal reactions of government to each type of shocks. We can therefore derive the cyclicality of optimal fiscal policy with respect to permanent and to transitory shocks separately.
Assume that permanent output Y p changes over time as a result of permanent shocks p t in the following way:
(1) ), 1 (
Assume that the permanent shock p t is a random variable, independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), with a positive expectation p > 0. Output is equal to permanent output with the addition of a temporary shock e t : (2) ). 1 (
The random variable e t is i.i.d. as well, but with expectation 0. Note that equations (1) and (2) imply that the p shocks are permanent while the e shocks are temporary and have an effect for one period only.
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Assume that the government is supplying one aggregate public good at an amount G t in each period t. The public good can be financed either by taxes, which have a flat tax rate, T t in period t, or by debt issue, where the amount of debt by the end of period t is D t .
The government temporal budget constraint is therefore:
The government derives utility from supplying the public good and disutility from taxes, or utility from disposable income, which is income net of tax left to private consumption. Assume that utilities from the public good and from disposable income are concave. For simplicity assume that logarithmic utility functions, so temporal utility of the government from these two elements is:
It is assumed that both shocks are exogenous, and especially that the transitory shock is not affected by fiscal policy. This is of course a simplifying assumption. This issue is dealt with in the empirical analysis.
Note, that since the government derives utility from G and disutility from T, it has an incentive to produce as much as possible public good and collect as little as possible taxes, and to finance all public consumption by debt, as shown in (3). This of course should not be possible and the model should also have a mechanism that prevents accumulating endless debt relative to output. Note that a no-Ponzi-game condition for the government is not always sufficient to rule out the solution of zero taxes and full supply of the public good. Hence, we assume a slightly stronger assumption, that the government has disutility from public debt, and more precisely from debt as a share of output.
We therefore assume that the government maximizes the following intertemporal utility, which in every period is affected positively by public good supply, by disposable income, and also negatively by the relative size of the public debt. For simplicity we assume that the rate of discount of the government is equal to the interest rate. Thus the government maximizes:
This utility function guarantees that the public debt to output ratio never exceeds the upper bound d.
We cannot derive a full analytic solution of the maximization of (4), but we can derive the optimal cyclical fiscal policy. Denote by V t the optimal value of the government utility in period t. Then the Bellman equation in period 0 can be written as:
Using the government budget constraint (3) we can rewrite the Bellman equation by use of the debt and the tax rate only:
Note that the tax rate chosen in period 0 has no effect on the future public welfare except through public debt. Hence, V 1 does not depend on current taxes but on debt only.
We therefore can derive from the first order condition of (6) the optimal tax rate and the optimal amount of the public good, as functions of the levels of public debt:
Substituting (7) and (8) in the Bellman condition (6) we get:
. From (9) it follows that the optimal value function V has the following shape:
(10) . , ,
Hence, the expectation in period 0 of the optimal value V 1 is equal to:
As a result the first order condition of the Bellman equation (9) is:
It follows from this FOC that the optimal new debt depends on the old debt and on the temporary shock e 0 only, so it is described by the following function f:
and if the debt to output ratio is close to d we have
Hence, the debt to output ratio does not diverge, but is bounded by d. As for the cyclicality of fiscal policy, it follows from condition (12) that
Hence, the optimal debt policy reacts counter-cyclically to transitory shocks. The reason for this result is that when the shocks are transitory, the debt does not increase in the long run, and thus it efficiently acts as a shock absorber against transitory shocks. Substituting (13) in (7) and (8) 
. Hence public expenditures are counter-cyclical with respect to transitory shocks. Interestingly they are a-cyclical with respect to permanent shocks. Taxes follow the same pattern. The intuition for these results is straightforward. When the economy experiences a temporary output shock, the government likes to increase public expenditure in the present but in all future periods as well. As a result taxes are increased, but also current public expenditures, though by less than output. Note also that the share of the public deficit in GDP is:
(15) . ,
Hence, the deficit is negatively related to the lagged debt to output ratio and is negatively related to the transitory shock. The deficit is, therefore counter-cyclical with respect to transitory shocks.
Permanent and Temporary Shocks in OECD Countries
In this section we use the Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology to calculate permanent and transitory shocks for 22 OECD countries. According to this methodology, the vector X, including both the GDP and unemployment, follows a stationary process:
and where the sequence of matrices A is such that its upper left hand entries, a 11 (j), j=1,2,…, sum up to zero. This assumption implies that the transitory shocks e r do not affect the level of GDP in the long-run, while the permanent shocks, e p , have a permanent effect on output.
In order to apply the methodology we first run VAR equations for the difference of logarithm of GDP and unemployment, controlling for the logarithmic change of government expenditure (instrumented in a TSLS procedure).
5 Although according to our theoretical model shocks are exogenous, from an empirical point of view we cannot completely ignore a causal relationship between government expenditure and output shocks. 6 We therefore include government expenditure in the VAR equations. This is intended to ensure that the shocks we identify from the residuals, are exogenous to fiscal 5 To assure stationarity, we used first differences of ln(unemployment). 6 See Blanchard and Perotti (2002). policy as much as possible. Since government expenditure includes cyclical components, we pursue a TSLS approach using the HP-filtered series as an instrument.
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We run these equations for 22 OECD countries during the period 1963-2006.
Then, by using the above identifying assumption, we solve the system according to the Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology and calculate the permanent and the transitory shocks. In Figure 1 we show the shocks for the different countries. It is interesting to note that some of the shocks are well known, like the negative impact of the fall of former USSR in Finland's output (1990) (1991) and the positive permanent impact of the German Unification (after 1991). In a more systematic analysis, Table 1 shows the impact of global shocks like the 1973, 1979 (negative) and 1986 (positive) oil shocks on the different countries.
We also compare our shocks to those reported by Smets and Wouters (2007) for the US. They report the shocks classified into monetary and demand shocks (which are close to transitory shocks in our analysis), and productivity and mark-up shocks (which are close to our permanent shocks). In our comparison we have looked whether their demand shocks match our temporary shocks and whether their supply shocks match our permanent shocks. Out of 40 common observations, 43 percent of our transitory shocks match the sign of their demand shocks, and 61 percent of the permanent shocks. Out of 21 (23) of the big temporary (permanent) shocks identified in our framework during the common part of the sample, where big is defined as bigger than half of the standard deviation, about 30 percent (two thirds) are identified as big demand (supply) shocks by Smets and Wouters.
Table 1 -Global Shocks
This evidence allows us to conclude that the Blanchard and Quah methodology produces permanent and transitory shocks that are relatively consistent with our ex-ante expectations and with existing empirical evidence in the literature.
Empirical Implications
In this section we return to our theoretical model in order to derive its empirical implications, in order to test them with the data of these OECD countries. As shown in Section 2 the debt to output ratio is converging stochastically to a neighborhood of some 
Note that the coefficient a is positive but smaller than 1 and the coefficient b is positive.
Substituting (17) in equation (8) But in our empirical analysis we will not test directly equation (19) but the difference of expenditures over time, and we do it for two reasons. The main reason is that as equation (19) itself reveals, the effect of the temporary shock on total expenditures is rather small, while the effect of the temporary shock on the change in expenditures in that period is much more pronounced. Hence, the difference equation of (19) is more likely to track the effect of the transitory shock on expenditures. The second reason is that all other studies of cyclicality of fiscal policy measure the response of the change in expenditures and following a similar test will make the results of this paper more comparable to the literature. have unclear signs, B 3 is positive, and B 4 is negative. X is a vector of control variables.
Our main hypothesis is that temporary shocks have a negative effect on expenditures, namely that b is positive. This is translated to the condition that:
(22) B 1 = -B 2 , and B 1 < B 3 .
But note that if B 1 comes out negative it means that b is not just positive but also greater than 1, namely this is a strong support to our result that the reaction of fiscal policy to temporary shocks is negative.
We next examine the dynamics of deficits. From equations (15) and (17) it follows that: In order to test our thesis we use the sample of 22 OECD countries, for the period 1963 to 2006. We look at actual data on general government expenditure and budget deficits as a percent of GDP. 8 For government expenditure we use the logarithmic change of government expenditure, deflated by GDP prices. As explained by Lane (2003) , this measure accounts for real changes in government wages, and thus it is one of the channels for cyclical policy. In all regressions we control for fixed effects for countries and years.
Fiscal Policy in OECD Countries and Permanent and Temporary Shocks

Government expenditure
In Table 2 we test the cyclicality of expenditure to permanent (PERM) and temporary (TEMP) shocks. In the first column we use the main control variables together with the permanent and transitory shocks, according to equation (21). The significant control variables for expenditure are the logarithmic change of the population with one-year lag (POP(-1)) and the share of children less than 15 years old in the population (POP15). We tried also the election dates (ELECT), and the share of 65+ years old in the population (POP65), but these variables were not significant. This column shows, in accordance to our model, that government expenditure reacts counter-cyclically to temporary shocks, since the effect of temporary shocks, which is significantly negative, is much smaller than the effect of the permanent shock, which is insignificantly different than 0. In the second regression we test whether the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty (MAAS) in the early nineties changed the cyclical behavior of the governments. In fact, Galí and Perotti (2003) found that policy became more countercyclical for countries that signed the Treaty. By using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the countries and years relevant in the Treaty and 0 otherwise, we found that the coefficient is not significant at 5 percent -i.e., policy continued to be countercyclical in a similar way.
Finally, we perform a similar test for the countries participating at the Euro agreement (EURO), and find that in this case as well the change in behavior is not significant. In summary, Table 2 shows that expenditures tend to react counter-cyclically to temporary shocks, in a strong way, as is predicted by the model. In all tables: * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Table 3 checks whether the countercyclical reaction to shocks is due to the reaction in recessions -negative shocks (REC) -or in expansions -positive shocks (EXP). We also check whether they are related to big -defined as more than half (BIG) and one (BIG 1) standard deviation of shocks -and persistent (PERS) shocks -defined as more than 4 consecutive years. The first regression tests whether the counter-cyclicality of expenditure is due to recessions (negative shocks) or expansions (positive shocks). The significant coefficients are for temporary shocks, both in recessions and expansions with a higher coefficient in recessions. A similar result is obtained when we look at persistent permanent shocks:
coefficients are not significant while they remain significant for temporary shocks. These results allow us to conclude that while expenditure is countercyclical with respect to temporary shocks, there is no evidence of pro-cyclicality with respect to permanent shocks. In the third regression we look at big temporary shocks: significance of coefficients remain in both expansions and recessions (with a higher coefficient). The fourth regression relates to Perotti (2005) , who found a significant change in his assessment of the impact of fiscal policy since 1980. In regression 4 we check the reaction of fiscal policy in this period and we find a very similar pattern. Table 4 looks at the components of expenditure, as in Lane (2003) . We look at transfers (GT), government consumption (GC) and government investment (GI). The first regression is for transfers, which is one of the two main items together with government consumption. The control variables include the change in unemployment (d(U)), in order to see whether the countercyclicality of transfers is beyond the one of unemployment payments. Results show that the coefficient of transitory shocks is significant, i.e., transfer payments react countercyclically to temporary shocks. This finding is in line with findings by Melitz (2005) and Darby and Melitz (2007) . The second regression is for government consumption, and we found that coefficients are not significant at 5 percent.
Finally, results for public investment show that they are procyclical against permanent shocks. In order to learn more about these results we proceed as in the previous analysis by differentiating between expansions and recessions. Column 4 reports this test for transfers, showing that countercyclicality is due to recessions. Column 5 reports the results for government consumption. Concerning investment, results show that procyclicality occurs both in expansions and recessions (significant at 10 percent). Table 5 focuses on the general government deficit. The control variables used for the deficit are different from those for expenditure. Following Barro (1979) , we use the control variable of temporary expenditure (like war-related spending), measured as the gap between actual expenditure and its HP-filtered trend. We control for "one-time"
Government budget deficit
expenditures in the spirit of Barro (1979) by a variable of particularly high deviations from trend -more than one standard deviation. We use this variable, GYGAP, also with a one year lag. Another control variable, which turns to be significant, is election years (ELECT), as implied by the political economy literature.
9 Table 5 -Deficit Reaction to Temporary and Permanent Shocks (TSLS 1 ,t statistic in parentheses, using fixed effects for countries and years) The first regression tests whether changes in the deficit/output ratio are related to temporary shocks. It shows that, similar to expenditures and consistently with the theoretical model, deficits are counter-cyclical to temporary shocks. In the second regression we check whether there was a change in behavior for countries that joined the Maastricht Treaty. Results are not significant. This is also the case for countries joining the Euro agreement (third regression). Table 6 checks the cyclicality of deficits in expansions and recessions. The first regression shows a similar result to the one found for expenditures: the countercyclicality with respect to temporary shocks is mainly for recessions, although the significant result was found for a one-year lag. Concerning expansions the coefficient is significant both for contemporary and for one-year lag coefficients, with an opposite sign.
In the next regression we test the reaction to big shocks, larger than half standard deviation, and we get similar results compared to the ones for all shocks. The last regression concentrates on a shorter sample, beginning at 1980. It shows a countercyclical reaction in recessions with respect to temporary shocks, with a one-year lag. 
Conclusions
This paper examines the optimal reaction of fiscal policy to permanent and transitory shocks. In an uncertain environment, we find that the optimal reaction to a temporary shock is countercyclical due to smoothing of tax rates and of consumption of the public good. Concerning permanent shocks, our theoretical model suggests that reaction to permanent shocks should be a-cyclical. By using Blanchard and Quah (1989) Dependent\ Independent variable
Number of observations 815 815 575
Period 1964-2006 1964-2006 1980-2006 C 0.11 (0.6) methodology for differentiating between permanent and temporary shocks, we test these implications for a sample of 22 OECD countries in the period 1963-2006 using both panel and individual country regressions. We find that both deficits and expenditures react counter-cyclically to temporary shocks, mainly through public transfers and mainly in recessions. We did not find evidence of pro-cyclical expenditure policy when reacting to permanent shocks, except for government investment.
This paper is a first exploration in the direction of the differential reaction of fiscal policy to permanent vs. transitory shocks. It shows that the difference is significant and should be further explored. One possible extension is to examine this issue in less developed countries, unlike our sample of OECD countries. It would be interesting to examine whether less developed countries differ in their fiscal policy because they differ in the type of output shocks they face, namely are their shocks more permanent than transitory? If on the contrary it is found that they face similar shocks, then it would lend support to the view that their pro-cyclical fiscal policies are caused by other reasons, like credit constraints. 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 
II: Government policy Reaction to Permanent and Transitory Shocks using Arellano Bond Estimation Technique
Since our VAR regressions use as a control variable the change in government expenditure (instrumented by its HP filtered trend), one possible interpretation is that TEMP and TEMP(-1) are functions of the dependent variable. In that case the usual assumptions of a lack of autocorrelation would not apply. To correct for this possible bias we show in this appendix results using the Arellano and Bond technique, which copes with this drawback. The reported t statistics are based on robust standard deviations. 
